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The Role of the
Courts and Legislatures
in the Reform of Tort Law
That the law of torts needs continuous reformn is not disputed; but debate does rage over the proper Tole of the
courts and legislaturein such law revision. In this Article, Professor Peck asserts that the judiciary should
evaluate the comparative abilities of the courts and legislature to make the revision, in the context of the particular case. In setting out the criteria by which this
evaluation should be made, he reveals the realities of
the legislative process that hinder the reform of tort law:
legislators are basically indifferent to tort law-making;
legislators lack experience, time, and adequate wages;
legislaturesfail to hold satisfactory committee and public hearings;legislators are subject to well-organized lobbies and pressure groups. Professor Peck then examines
recent catalytic court decisions that have sparked legislative enactments, to show that a creative judicial role
does not conflict with the legislature; he concludes that,
to overcome legislative inertia,the courts should play a
more positive role in the reform of tort law.

Cornelius J. Peck*
The necessity of continuous reform in areas of the private law
has long been recognized. More than 40 years ago Mr. Justice
Cardozo forcefully argued for a "ministry of justice," which
would -recommend needed reforms in the law.' Following demonstrations of how law changes and the role that judges played in
Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HEARv. L. Rnv. 113 (1921).
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producing that change, 2 there has been an increased demand
for judicial participation in the reform process. Professor Robert
Keeton recently commented with approval on "candidly creative" judicial action;' for example, he calls on the judiciary to
establish a comparative negligence scheme to supplant the more
prevalent contributory negligence rule. 4 Professor Seavey, summarizing conclusions based on nearly a half-century of teaching

torts, has also urged an active and creative role for the judiciary with respect to many problems of tort law, ranging from
the liability of innocent converters and the rule denying contribution to the adoption of comparative negligence and changes
in the law of defamation." Other scholars have also urged an
activist role for the judiciary' - in fact, Mr. Justice Traynor
has publicly stated that the concern for judicial activity should
focus on the continuing scarcity of creative opinions rather than
on the overabundance of activity.7
Not all legal scholars have so enthusiastically approved of
an active reform role for the judiciary. Mr. Justice Holmes, in
one of his famous phrases, characterized the judicial power to
legislate as interstitial - a power confined "from molar to molecular motions."28 Even Judge Jerome Frank, a leader of the jurisprudential realists, has urged a modest role for the courts in
performing their inescapable function of judicial legislation,'
while others have more firmly opposed active judicial reform."
Of course, a good part of the battle rages over the substance
2. See, e.g., CxARozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); CAnDozO, TuE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1930); LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).

3. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HIAv. L. REv.
463

(1962).

4. Id. at 506-09.
COGITATIONS ON TORTS 52-72 (1954).
6. E.g., CAHILL, JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 149-60 (1952); Green, The Thrust
of Tort Law: PartII JudicialLaw Making, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 115, 121 (1962);
5. SEA=v,

James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BurFALO L. REV. 315, 334 (1959).
7. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
TODAY AND ToMoRRow 48, 52 (1959). See also Reinann v. Monmouth Consol.
Water Co., 9 NJ. 134, 140, 87 A.2d 325, 328 (1952) (Vanderbilt, CJ., dissenting).
8. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dis-

senting).
9. Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Frank, J., concurring).
10. E.g., Cooperrider, A Comment on "The Law of Torts," 56 Micu. L.
REv. 1291 (1958).
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of the proposed reforms. Scholars may easily disagree about the
extent to which the law of torts should be reformulated to encompass additional mechanisms of loss distribution. They may
likewise disagree, for example, on the opportunity for fraud
created by a rule abrogating interspousal immunity in tort cases.
But inevitably, debate over the reform of the law of torts involves the question of the proper role of the courts and the
legislature in law-making and law revision. The advocate of
reform by the judiciary is often informed by the court that
the requested revision falls within the peculiar competence of
the legislature3' On the other hand, the defender of the status
quo has frequently been told - perhaps more frequently in
recent years - that common-law traditions require the judiciary to alter and adapt its decisional law to meet the demands
of our rapidly changing society. ' The conflicting opinions on
the proper role of the courts and legislatures in the reform of
tort law have unfortunately yielded little, if any, careful analysis of the criteria by which the conflict should be decided. As
Dean Frank Newman has said, "it seems inexcusable that we
are still so ignorant on the question, 'By whom and how are
laws best made?' "i
This Article will explore that question with particular reference to the law of torts and present at least a partial evalua11. E.g., Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961); Faber v.
State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 Pad 609 (1960); Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147,
106 A.2d 563 (1954); Reimann v. Monmouth ConsoL Water Co., 9 NJ. 134,
87 A.2d 325 (1952); Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore.
489, 280 Pd 301 (1955); Knecht v. Saint Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140
A-2d 30 (1958); Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 88
(1959); cf. Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See
also Gallick v. Baltimore & O.RL, 372 U.S. 108, 123 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 Pod 457, 11 Cal.
Rep. 89 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 1l. App. 2d 11, 103
N.E2d 89 (1959); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 NJ. 172, 162 A.2d 820
(1960); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 NJ. 29, 141 A.2d 276
(1958); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.d 237, 176 N.Ead 729, 219 N.Y.Sad 34
(1961); Witte v. Fullerton, 376 Pad 244 (Ohla. 1962); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.d 765 (1953); Holytz v.
City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Kojis v. Doctors
Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961); see Reimann v. Monmouth
Consol. Water Co., 9 NJ. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952) (Vanderbilt, CJ., dissenting); cf. Eick v. Perk Dog Food, 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
13. Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State Legislature, in Ix,
GAL InwsmTmUoxs TODAY

A-D Tom omow 67, 88-89 (1959).
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tion of the comparative abilities of courts and legislatures to
revise the law. In so framing the question, however, one must
be cautious of searching for a single answer applicable to all
phases of such a comprehensive problem. The major criticism
of those who have discussed the creative role of the courts in
judicial law-making is that they have failed to differentiate
between the varied contexts in which the problem appears.
Obviously, the creative role suggested for the courts in the
area of contracts and property law or an area dominated by
legislation and administrative regulation, such as taxation, is
markedly different from the role it should play in the areas of
procedure and torts. 4 But even within these categories a more
discriminating approach should be taken to avoid label-thinking.
Thus, a court may properly refuse to expand the protection
given by tort law against certain trade practices because legislation and administrative regulation have established a pattern of legal control.'5 Yet the same court could properly exercise a creative role to expand the protection given by tort law
against intentional infliction of emotional harm even though it
occurred in a business context. 6
I.

LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE

Having issued a warning against generalization, one may
now be permitted to make one. It is that as a general proposition, legislatures are indifferent to the problems of reform of
tort law. As Professor Cowan has articulated, "legislatures have
no stomach for reform in tort law"; 1 7 correspondingly, Professor
14. In reforming the law, a number of courts have considered that the
change related to the law of torts as being a significant factor. Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 26, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96
(1959); Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W.2d 105 (1946); Fussner v.
Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 361, 113 N.W.2d 355, 364 (1961); Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 179, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1953);
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 657, 251 P.2d 149, 156 (1952). But of. Ielton
v. Sisters of Mercy, 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961). The commentators have also,
of course, frequently pointed out the distinction in urging an active reform
role in the area of torts. E.g., SEAVEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 66-68.
15. E.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929); see
Chafee, Unfair Competition,53 HAlv. L. Rnv. 1289 (1940).
16. E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952). For a discussion of the propriety of an active role for
the courts with respect to this problem, see text accompanying notes 190-93
infra.
17. Cowan, Rule or Standard in Tort Law, 13 RUTGFS L. Rsv. 141, 15960 (1958).
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Pedrick has pointed out that the piecemeal legislation adopted
is of equal significance to the total picture of legislative inactivity. 8 Moreover, statutorily imposed tort liabilities may be
inconsistent with the principles of tort law, as where a statute
imposes a limited liability on parents whose children wilfully or
maliciously destroy property. The obvious purpose of such legislation is to combat juvenile delinquency rather than to fulfill
the compensatory objectives of tort law.'9 Even though a statute
is generally consistent with the objectives of tort law, the motivation for enactment may not have been the achievement of
those objectives. For example, during the 30 years that proposals to waive the United States' immunity from tort liability
were under consideration, Congress must have realized that such
a waiver was consistent with both the objectives of the law of
torts and valid governmental interests. But apparently the increasing burden of reviewing over 2000 private bills during each
session of Congress, rather than an interest in a more symmetrical
scheme of tort law, finally produced congressional action 0
If additional proof is needed that legislatures frequently overlook or ignore the problems of tort law, it may be convincingly
18. Pedrick, On Civilizing the Law of Torts, 6 J. Soc'Y Pur.TEAeums L.
2, 8-9 (1961).
'19. See Peck, ParentalLiability for Wilful and Malicious Acts of Children,
36 WAsH. L. B-v. 327 (1961).
20. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1952). The Report
of the House of Representatives stated in support of the legislation that became the Federal Tort Claims Act:
For many years the present system has been subjected to criticism,
both as being unduly burdensome to the Congress and as being unjust
to the claimants, in that it does not accord to injured parties a recovery as a matter of right but bases any award that may be made on
considerations of grace. Moreover, it does not afford a well-defined
continually operating machinery for the consideration of such claims.
The magnitude of the task of considering and disposing of private
claims can be gathered from the following statistics:
In the Sixty-eighth Congress about 2,000 private claim bills were
introduced, of which 250 became law, then the largest number in the
history of the Claims Committee.
In the Seventieth Congress 2,68 private claim bills were introduced, asking more than $100,000,000. Of these, 386 were enacted, appropriating about $2,830,000, of which 144, in the amount of 8562,000,
were for tort.

In each of the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Congresses over
2,800 private claim bills were introduced, seeking more than $100,000,000. Tn the Seventy-sixth Congress approximately 2,000 bills were introduced, of which 315 were approved for a total of $826,000.
In the Seventy-seventh Congress, of the 1,829 private claim bills in-
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found in the frequency with which legislatures enact criminal
statutes that provide no concurrent civil remedies for one injured by the criminal conduct. In some instances the courts have
supplemented the statutory language by applying the doctrine
of negligence per se to unexcused violations of criminal statutes,
but the difficulties encountered in the application of that doctrine warrant the assumption that a legislature concerned with
the civil consequences of a violation would have stated them.
Perhaps the underlying legislative rationale is that the criminal
law, which sets guidelines for future conduct, is worthy of legislative consideration; whereas tort law, which is only a system
for distributing fortuitous losses, does not merit the exercise of
the planning function of legislation. In any event, the civil consequences of violations are frequently ignored by legislatures.
This legislative indifference to tort law might be considered
a delegation knowingly made to an expert body qualified at
reformulating particular rules while maintaining consistency of
governing principles- much as delegations of power to administrative agencies have been viewed. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has characterized the Federal Employers Liability Act as a statute by which Congress created "only a framework within
which the courts were left to evolve . . . a system of principles providing compensation for injuries to employees consistent
with the changing realties of employment in the railroad industry."'21 If the question could be raised, such an indefinite delegation might properly be determined constitutional by analogy
to delegations of authority to administrative agencies, which
have been sustained because experience and custom have made
sufficiently explicit standards that otherwise would have been
too vague.2 2 But, tempting as this view of a conscious delegation may be, the truth lies elsewhere.
II.

THE MOTIVATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND
WORKING CONDITIONS OF LEGISLATORS

If legislatures were composed of a modern day equivalent of
Plato's guardians or philosopher kings- a group selected on
troduced and referred to the Claims Committee, 593 were approved for
a total of $1,000,253.30.... So far during the present Congress about
1,279 private claim bills have been introduced. Of these, 225 have been
enacted, appropriating about $965,358.06.
H.R. REP.No. 1287, 79th CONG., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
91. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 437 (1958), 34 WAs,,.
L. REv. 108 (1959).
22. Fahey v. Mallonee, 832 U.S. 245, 250-53 (1947); of. NLRB v. Radio
Eng'rs, 364 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1961).
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the basis of ability and prepared by a special education to settle
affairs dispassionately for the good of the republic -they would
undoubtedly undertake periodic, systematic reappraisals of the
effectiveness of tort principles in serving society. Without descending to the stereotyped and frequently erroneous characterization of politicians, however, this is clearly not the case.
Even at their best, members of state legislatures bear but little
resemblance to Plato's guardians.
A recent study of the political socialization of state legislators23 indicates that, while over half of the state legislators first
became interested in politics in the pre-college or equivalent
period, a sizeable proportion became interested after college or
its. equivalent period.2 4 The fact that almost one-third of
state legislators are lawyers by occupation 5 suggests that they
are qualified to make competent reappraisals of the principles
of private law; of course this generalization does not apply to
the very large occupation group consisting of farmers." Nor
is there more than a conjectural hope that any special preparation for the role of lawmaker was included in the formal education of 'merchants, businessmen, bankers, real estate men,
insurance brokers, and professional men who collectively com2 T
pose the largest category of legislator occupations.
iProfessor Leon Green has opined that there are not large
numbers of scholarly men in state legislatures, a factor which
he believes weighs in favor of judicial reform of tort rules.28 Another writer has expressed the idea that a scholarly approach
would only entangle a legislator because his function is to act,
to fight, and to seize advantages rather than to meditate on
93. Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson & Wahlke, The Poltical Sodal atiobn of
State Legilators, in L.GIsLA.Tv Bnn~vior 305 (Wahlke & Eulau eds. 1959).
24. Id. at 306.
25. During the period 1925 to 1935 lawyers held 28% of the seats in the
upper and lower houses of 13 states selected for study. Hyneman, Who Makei
Our Laws, 55 POL. ScI. Q. 556, 557 (1940), reprinted in LEGar
Bnamvion
254, 255 (Wahlke & Eulau eds. 1959). A more recent study indicates that the
proportion of lawyers in state legislatures has declined to less than 25%.
A.uwanc"A Poia'rcAL ScuaNcE Ass'&, Awrmuc.w STATS LuEaisLAuns 71 (Zeller
ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as Ax CAc STATE LEnisrrAuns].
26. The study by Hyneman, supra note 25, at 557, revealed that in the
beriod 1925 to 1935 farmers occupied 21.5% of the memberships in the state
legislatures studied. A more recent study indicates that in 1949 the propor-

tion was slightly less than 20%. Awmnucx STAT LEGLrss

uRns 71.

27. A.Ewcw STATE LEGnzA'uRs 71. See also Hyneman, supra note 25,
at 557.
28. Green, supranote 6, at 117-18.
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them. 9 While it is improbable that any empirical test can be
devised to measure the scholarly attributes of legislators, an
abundance of evidence indicates that the legislative environment is not conducive to scholarly or detailed examination which
is essential to effective reformulation of a complicated area of
private law.
A notoriously inadequate compensation scale80 requires many,
if not most, legislators to supplement their incomes through outside employment- they perform their legislative work during
time borrowed from their regular full-time employment. Although some legislators can limit the demands of their regular
employment during the legislative session, those demands certainly cannot be slighted by all. In short, state legislators are
part-time employees whose thoughts are directed substantially
to other matters.
Even if legislators could devote all of their legislative time
to the study of substantive proposals, the length of legislative
sessions would seriously hamper scholarly work.8 ' Most legislatures meet for such limited periods of time that they cannot
give the prolonged, detailed, and studious attention necessary
for an effective study of any area in which the existing rules are
technical, complicated, and frequently stated in a legal jargon
29. Finer, The Tasks and Functions of the Legislator, in LE GiSLATIV BEHAVIOR 281, 282 (Wahlke & Bulau eds. 1959).
30. At the end of 1961 the range of salaries per biennium was from $200 in
New Hampshire to $15,000 in New York, while the median salary of the 34
states paying salaries was $3,900 to $4,000. For the 19 states employing a
daily or weekly pay plan, the pay rate varied from $5 to $50 per day, with a
median daily pay of $15. All but five of the daily-pay states and all but 11 of
the salary states also paid living expense allowances that sometimes exceeded

the basic pay. THE CouNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, TnE BOOK OF THS
STATES 1962-1963, at 37 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BooK OF THE STATES
1962-1963]. See generally BABCOCK, STATE AN LocAn GOVERsMENT AND POLITICS 183 (2d ed. 1962).
31. Only 18 state legislatures meet annually; the remaining 32 hold bienor TE STATES 1962-1963, at 35. Fifteen states have regular unlimited sessions; 21 directly limit them to a specified number of days,
frequently 60 legislative or calendar days; 11 indirectly limit the length of the
session by stopping pay or allowances after a certain number of days; and 3
others have other methods of limitation. Id. at 36, 42-43. Special sessions are
less restricted: 25 states have no limit; 15 are directly limited; and the remainder are indirectly limited by restrictions on pay or allowances. Ibid.
Longer legislative sessions do not necessarily mean more time spent on legislation. In New Jersey, for example, the legislature sits once a week over a
five month period, but commuting problems distract attention from legislation. Anton, The Legislature, Politics and Public Policy: 1959, 14 RuTaEls L.
REV. 269, 278 (1960).

nial sessions. BooK
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unfamiliar to most non-lawyers. Moreover, a high turnover rate
precludes any great accumulation of legislative experience 3 2 This
turnover rate even affects the chairmen of committees, with the
result that the average committee head is relatively new at the
procedures of law-making33
Legislators are limited not only by the lack of legislative
experience and the shortness of the legislative session; they must
also work under physical conditions that are unsatisfactory for
deliberate consideration of complex matters. The provisions for
office space, 34 committee rooms,"m and secretarial services30 are,
in most states, inadequate at best.
32. Almost 50% of the members of state legislatures have very little legislative experience. A-Amacw SATE LEoisrATuns 65, 67, 70. According to another study of ten state legislatures during the six sessions held from 1925 to
1935, an average of 35.4% of the legislators in any given session were attending their first session and another 22.6% were attending their second session;
slightly more than 20% had served as many as four sessions. Hyneman, Tenure
and Turnover of Legislative Personnel, 195 Annals 21, 23 (1938). A more recent
study indicates that a high level of turnover has continued. See Beckett &
Sunderland, Washington State's Lawmakers: Some Personnel Factors in the
Waslington. Legislature, 10 WESTERN POL. Q. 180, 188 (1957). See also Hyneman & Ricketts, Tenure and Turnover of the Iowa Legislature, 24 IowA L.
REv. 673 (1939); Hyneman, Legislative Experiences of Illinois Lawmaler, 3
U. Cmr. L. REv. 104 (1935).
33. According to the Hyneman study, 17.3% of committee chairmen were
serving in their first session of the legislature while another 24.8% were attending their second sessions. Only 28.1% had attended five or more sessions.
Hyneman, supra note 32, at 25. A similar pattern was shown in a later study
of committee chairmen in 1950. AaNnmucu STATE LEGIsLATURES 68-70.
34. A report published in 1954 indicates that at that time no state provided all its legislators with individual offices. Axmuc"u STATE LEGISLATURES
159. Thirty-six states did not provide individual office space for members of
either house; three states provided individual office space for senate members,
eight provided office space to be shared by varying numbers of senators; and
five states provided office space to be shared by varying numbers of representatives. Id. at 157. A former Connecticut state senator recently described
his working conditions as follows: "I had no office staff and indeed no office except for a corner in my hallway at home, where unsorted and unfiled letters,
brochures, notes, and thousands of bills constantly threatened to bury my
children under a paper cascade." Lockard, The Tribulationsof a State Senator,
in LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR 294, 296 (Wablke & Eulau eds. 1959).
35. An earlier study of the New Jersey legislature indicates that in 1938
there were no committee rooms for committee meetings, and consequently
hearings had to be held in the Assembly Chamber at times when the legislature was not using the space. McKEux, PRnssuRE ON Tim LEGISLATURE OF NLv
JERSEY

47 (1938).

36. The study of American State Legislatures made in 1954 by the American Political Science Association indicated that at that time fewer than 20
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In recent years, however, some legislators have been pro.
vided with the assistance of legislative reference and bill drafting services, or legislative councils and law revision commissions
have been established to originate law reform. In fact, the members of all state legislatures presently have some such staff services available,37 but these services vary greatly between states,
and their significance to the problem at hand will be considered
below.
Of course, men have been known to make notable achievements even under adverse conditions, especially where selfinterest motivated their labors. The pragmatic nature of American politics, however, is revealed in a survey showing that only
a small minority of state legislators entered politics because of
political principles. s8 Many political scientists have expressed
the opinion that party politics is a relatively unimportant factor
in the adoption of state legislation;"0 instead, most legislators
are simply striving to satisfy the organized local interests of
their respective constituencies. 40 A legislator will probably avoid
general legislation that has no organized support from his constituents for the double reason that his action will not bring him
credit with his electors, and it may alienate other legislators whose
41
votes are important if he is to serve his constituency loyally.
In this respect lawyers probably do not differ from other
legislators, which partially explains their inactivity in reforming
the private law, despite their substantial numbers in state legislatures. A less flattering explanation is that their interest in legislative service is engendered by an opportunity to obtain permissible "advertising" while serving their established clients. 2
Finally, the dilution of urban and suburban voting strength
states assumed the responsibility for providing individual legislators with
stenographic assistance in adequate quantity. In only five states did legislators have individually assigned stenographic or secretarial help, and in another
each legislator received $2,400 a biennium for clerical assistance. However,
29 states did provide clerical and secretarial assistance for their standing committees, and such assistance was available to major committees in seven states.
A.smIcANr STATE LwzisLATuss

156.

37. BOOK OF THE STATES 1962-1963, at 63.
38. Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson & Wahlke, supra note 23, at 311.
39. AMRucAN STATE LEGISLATURES 192; Anton, supra note 31, at 274-75;
cf. Silverman, The Legislators' View of the Legislative Process, in LEGISLATIVE
BEHAvIOR 298, 301 (Wahlke & Eulau eds. 1959).
40. AMRICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 192-93; Anton, supra note 31, at 27374. See also Green, supra note 6, at 117.
41. Anton, supra note 81, at 273-74.
42. See BABcoCK, op. cit. supra note 30, at 183; McKE N., op. ct. supra
note 35, at 42.
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in state legislatures should be considered. That the rural population enjoys a much greater representation than the urban population cannot be denied 43 Legislators from rural areas naturally
attempt to satisfy their constituents and tend to lack concern
for urban problems. Yet the needed reforms in the law of torts
are primarily the result of industrialization, the centralization of
commercial activities, and other factors accompanying the development of a highly urbanized society. Rural populations are less
claims-conscious than their urban counterparts, perhaps because
the rigors of rural life induce an acceptance of hardships that
urban residents would find unacceptable. 44 In short, the problem areas in the law of torts are of less concern to the rural
population and its representatives than to the population as a
whole, and in many state legislatures, the representatives of
rural areas direct the course of legislative affairs.
Ill.

LEGISLATIVE COBITTEES AND
COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Frequently when judges decline to accept the role of reformer
or innovator they do so in deference to the superiority which
the legislative process supposedly enjoys in its use of committee
hearings.4 5 The thought is that through committee hearings the
various effects of a change in law may be thoroughly investigated, the competing policy factors critically analyzed, and after
extensive consideration and evaluation, a reasoned and wellbalanced solution produced. Unfortunately, this idealized view
of the legislative process bears little resemblance to what political
scientists tell us are the realities of the situation.
For one thing, hearings are not held on all bills, and there is
a surprising lack of rules providing for advance notice and
scheduling of hearings.4 6 A recent study indicates that in all but
19 states whether or not the hearings will be open to the public
43. Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment,72 YAE LJ. 90 (1903).

44. Peek, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58

Micn. L. :R-v. 689, 711-12 (1960).

45. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.. 215, 264-67

(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 1S0 F.2d
290, 296 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp,. 35 Fad 279 (2d Cir. 1929); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist., 18 111. 2d 11, 40, 163 NB.2d 89, 103 (1959) (Davis, J., dissenting); Reimann v: Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9 NJ. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952).
46. AamnIe.A SmTn LEGsL&TuRS 102, 117-18; McKEN-, op. cit. supra
note 35, at 47.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:205

is a discretionary matter. Normally, the crucial decisions are
made in executive sessions, from which the press and the public
are excluded."' The records of committee hearings are in notoriously bad shape, 49 and the committee reports to the legislature
are frequently summary and uninformative." As an institution
for informing the entire legislative body about the content of
proposed legislation and the problems with which it deals, a
legislative committee leaves much to be desired.
This assumes, however, that the purpose of legislative committees is one of investigation, accumulation and evaluation of
data, and exploration of alternative solutions to various problems. Political scientists indicate, however, that hearings are
seldom held for this purpose, and if this result does obtain, it is
usually incidental to other purposes.51 Frequently committee
hearings are held to provide an appearance of well-reasoned
grounds to support action to which legislators are already committed. " If the matter under investigation is one about which
there is a division of commitments, the result is likely to be the
development of two fact pictures, each conforming to its adherents' views, rather than a complete and objective portrayal
of the situation.9 3
47. BooK OF THE STATES 1962-1963, at 49.
48. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 370 (1951).
49. AanuicAN STATE LEGISLATURES 102.
50. For example, the Report of the Committee an Judiciary- Civil of the
Washington House of Representatives on a bill, subsequently enacted, to
waive the state's immunity to suits in tort stated only:

We, a majority of your Committee on Judiciary -Civil, to whom was
referred House Bill No. 338, consenting to suits against state [sic] in
tort actions, have had the same under consideration, and we do respectfully report the same back to the House with the recommendation that
it do pass.
HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE 37TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 235
(1961). The report of the Senate was equally uncommunicative, using almost
identical language. SENATE JOURNAL OF THE 37TH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON 740 (1961). See also McKFAN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 47.

51. McKEAw, op. cit. supra note 35, at 48; TRUMAN, op. cit. "nspra note 48,
at 379;

STEINER

& GovE, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN ILLINOIS 83 (1960); Huit,

The CongressionalCommittee: A Case Study, 48 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 340, 3065
(1954). See also Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore, 37 MINN. L.
REv. 34, 37 (1952); Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J.
886, 892 (1950).
52. STEINER & Govw, op. cit. supra note 51, at 83; TntomAN, op. cit. supra
note 48, at 379; Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore,, 87 MINN. L.
REv. 34, 38 (1952); Cohen, Towards Realism in Legiprudencq, 59 YALE L.J.
886, 892 (1950).
53. See, e.g., Huit, supra note 51, at 358, 354, 365.
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: A very practical-purpose served by the hearings is that of
revealing the alignment of various interest groups on the subject,
thus providing a gauge of their support or opposition to a bill."
The cathartic value of committee hearings is obvious and may
even assist the legislators in their role as mediators between
contending pressure groups. In short, while committee hearings
may develop, some information upon which a well-reasoned
policy decision could be made, this is the exception rather than
the rule.
Even if legislative committees were organized to conduct
objective and scientific investigations of areas in which reform
legislation is needed, they are ill-equipped to do so. As mentioned above, near to one-half of the committee chairmen are
serving in either their first or second session of the legislature.
Committees frequently lack an adequate staff, and what they
have has been chosen, not for professional competence in investigation of technical problems, but for their connections and
political competence. 56 Moreover, insofar as reform in tort law
is concerned, the concentration of most legislative work in a
few standing committees"' goes far to ensure that there will
be no organized pool of talent to work on specialized problems.
What legislative proposals are made concerning the reform of
tort law will probably be referred to the already overworked
judiciary committee, with its far-flung interests.
Finally, no empirical data would be available for a substantial number of tort law subjects that a legislative committee
might investigate. For other subjects the empirical data is
equally available to the courts as to legislative committees. For
example, a field study probably could produce no valid and
detailed conclusions concerning the effect of an abandonment
of charitable immunity from tort liability on charitable donations or the level of charitable operations. The numerous uncontrolled variables affecting donations and charitable operations undermine the scientific approach. The same reasoning
applies to the removal of charitable or governmental immunity
from educational institutions. The crude fact that liability insur54. Tutnumi,

op. cit. supra note 48; Cohen, Hearing on a Bill. Legitlativc

Folklore, 37 MINN. L. Rnv. 34, 39 (1952).

55. See note 33 supra.
56. Aw=-c

STATE LsisrATuRns 160, 162;

Cohen, supra note 54, at

37-38 (1952).
57. ArmAIC

SiATE LuEcsLAnuRs 96. See also BABcocx, op. cit. supra

note 30, at 189 for a discussion of the usual standing committees, none of

which has a special relationship to tort law.
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ance permits the continued operation of charities and schools
in nonimmunity jurisdictions can be noted by courts as well as
58
legislatures.
To take another immunity rule as an example, one of the
reasons advanced in support of the inter-spousal immunity rule
is that abandonment would lead to a substantial number of
fraudulent claims, where liability insurance would cover the
claim. According to Professor McCurdy, insurers generally have
no statistics showing the number or amount of inter-spousal
automobile liability claims in states allowing such suits." That
other comprehensive and reliable data would be available to
legislative committees seems unlikely. Any legislative estimation of the effect of a change of that immunity rule would probably have to rest, as it does with courts, upon a priori assumptions.
As Judge Magruder has asked, ° could a factual survey establish that in a particular state the rule recognizing a privilege for
honest, but erroneous, statements concerning candidates for public office had the effect of driving honorable men from politics?
Would a more detailed documentation of the effect of modem
advertising campaigns on consumer purchasing habits and a
more complete account of the dangerous potential of automobiles have provided a sounder basis for the New Jersey Supreme
Court's holding that when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase, an implied warranty of fitness accompanies it into the hands of the
ultimate purchaser? 61
The suggestion is not that legislative committees could never
uncover empirical data bearing on a choice of or change in various tort rules, nor that courts have made adequate use of the
available data0 2 Important empirical data relevant to some tort
problems might be available to legislative committees. Thus, a
58. See, e.g., President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130
F.2d 810, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.,
18 I1. 2d 11, 163 N.E. 2d 89 (1959).
59. McCurdy, PersonalInjury Torts Between Spouses, 4 Vu. L. REv. 303,
334 (1959). Professor McCurdy does state, however, that there are indications that premium rates have increased in recent years in states that permit
inter-spousal suits, but he does not state exactly what those indications are.
60. Magruder, Judging in Tort Law: Intuition and Science, 5 CoLuM. L.
ALUm. BuLL. 31, 34 (1961).
61. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
62. See James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the JudicialProcess, 8 Bu'FFALo L. REV. 315, 325-28 (1959).
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study of the causes of trichinosis, its spread, and methods of
control might lead to a conclusion that a warranty of freedom
from trichinae should accompany a sale of pork. But courts
could make a better appraisal of the comparative abilities of the
judiciary and the legislature to deal with a particular problem if
consideration were given, on a selective basis, to the probabilities
that relevant empirical data would be available to legislative
committees but not to the judiciary.9
IV.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE AGENCIES

The handicaps under which state legislatures work have not
gone unnoticed. At the present time all state legislatures have
some kind of staff services, but the level and quality of these services vary greatly." Legislative reference services are available in
47 states, although some of their functions are now being assumed
by newer forms of service agencies 5 Valuable as their research
services are to state legislatures, they are library-oriented 0 and
are unlikely to turn up any information not available to judges
who look beyond the traditional sources of legal information.
Bill drafting and law revision services are also available in 47
states! 7 Although these services are important, they are primarily
confined to matters of form and style and utilize skills certainly
possessed in equal measure by the judiciary. Only a few states
provide for systematic revision of the substantive law; California,
Louisiana, and North Carolina having followed New York's lead
in this direction 8
The increasing use of legislative councils has been the most significant development in the reform of substantive law. Thirtynine states now have established legislative councils, 09 most of
which are super-interim committees of the legislature, formed on
a bipartisan and bicameral basis, and assisted by a research staff.
Some have broad statutory duties; some have been restricted by
statute; and others have imposed their own restrictions." In 1962,
63. Analysis demonstrating the difficulties of using the scientific method
for either judicial or legislative rule-maklng is contained in Cavers, Science,
Research, and the Law: Bente"s' "Experimentai Jurisp
," 10 J. LWAL
ED. 162 (1957).
64. Boom oFT
Tm STATEs 1960-1963, at 63.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 63-64.
Asmscwi STATE LwisrAws 14244.
Boor,oF' m STATEs 1962-1963, at 64.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Ama cAc STATE LoISmxATuas 128-30.
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budgets for legislative councils ranged from 29,500 to 850,000 dollars, with a median budget between 84,000 and 90,000 dollars.7
These variations suggest the fallacy of a generalized reliance on
the existence of the legislative council as an adequate instrument
for the reform of tort law. Not all councils have both the inclination and resources for productive work in the area. New York,
with its famous law revision commission, adopted three items of
what might be called tort legislation in 19562 and two similar
items in 1958," 3 but apparently enacted no significant tort legislation in 1955,14 1957,'5 1959,71 1960," 7 or 1961.78 A similar situation
apparently exists in Pennsylvania and Illinois.79 In each jurisdiction the courts could and should examine the record of the legislative council, if one exists, to determine how active and how successful the council has been in a particular field. In the course of
doing so a court may find, as did the New York Court of Appeals,
a council report gathering dust in legislative files that persuasively supports a court-made reform of tort law. 0
Other legislative services, such as interim legislative committees, have been provided in recent years. As a general proposition,
interim committees are less effective than legislative councils and
more limited in duration and scope of activity. The choice of subjects for investigation is determined by the interests of individual
members; much effort is wasted in organization; and they lack the
experienced staff that legislative councils may develop."' Again, a
court considering its reform role should properly determine not
merely the existence of interim committees, but whether they ever
investigate and successfully suggest proposals for the reform of
tort law.
Of course, with respect to all of these legislative service agencies the same question should be asked that was asked concerning
71. BooK OF THE STATES 1962-1963, at 65-66.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Note, 28 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 183-227 (1956).
Note, s0 N.Y.S.B. BuLL. 173--229 (1958).
Asch, New York Legislative Session, 1 N.Y.L.F. 224-4 (1955).
Note, 29 N.Y.S.B. BuLL. 198-244 (1957).

76. Note, 81 N.Y.S.B. BuLL. 150-91 (1959).

77. Note, 25 AimANT L. REv. 348-51 (1961).
78. Note, 33 N.Y.S.B. BulL. 218-28 (1961).
79. Pedrick, On Civilizing the Law of Torts, 6 J. Soc'y PuB. TEAcms L.
2, 8 (1961).
80. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 84
(1961) (relying upon a 1986 report of the Law Revision Commission that recommended changes in the earlier rule by which there was no recovery for
physical or mental injuries caused by negligently induced fright).
81. AkmaicAx STATE LEGISLATUES 137--39.
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legislative committees: Is it probable that empirical data bearing

on a particular area in which reform may be desirable exists in a
form available to the service agencies but not available to the ju-

diciary? In this respect it might be noted that, according to political scientists, the function of a legislative research staff is not to
gather primary data, but rather to collate and synthesize data
already culled by administrative agencies and private organizations!'
V. LOBBIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS
Political scientists unanimously assert that lobbies and pressure groups play a tremendously important role in the legislative
process. Professor Truman's authoritative work on the governmental process8s consists primarily of a study of pressure groups,
their problems of organization, and their tactics of influence. In
his judgment, political interest groups are as clearly a part of government as the political parties or the branches established by the
constitution." One scholarly state legislator came to believe after
two legislative sessions that outside group pressures accounted for
90 percent of what was done.s5 The authors of an fllinois study
concluded that non-legislators sometimes exert more influence on
legislative decisions than do members! 6 Moreover, the amateur
legislators, who make up a considerable part of state legislatures,
may find it difficult to identify the various pressure groups,8 T a
fact that may well intensify the significance of these group activities.
The scope of pressure group and lobby activity is, of course,
not confined to initiating legislation; of equal importance is their
opposition to the passage of legislation deemed inimical to their
interests. Since bills that have no organized support may fail to
pass even though unopposedes a pressure group or lobby can
82. Id. at 133.
83. T u,
op. ei. upa not 48.
84. Id. at 502. According to Truman,. the unorganized interests of society
also play a role in the governmental process, setting the rules or norms of conduct by which, the behavior of organized interest groups are judged. This
factor, as well as the overlapping of group memberships, serves as a check
against activities of organized groups. Id. at 512-16.
85. MOEAw, op. cit. supra note 35, at 218.
86. STEnm &Gov, op. cit. supra note 51, at 32-57. Included in this powerful group were the governor, the press, private lobbyists, and lobbyists for
various governmental units.
87. Garceau & Sullivan, A Pressure Group and the Pressured A Case Report, 48 A.m. PoL.Scr. RF. 672 (1954).
88. See TRumAN, op. cit. supranote 48, at 362-63.

282

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:205

easily dispatch such legislation to oblivion. Faced with organized
resistance on one side and no organized support on the other, the
choice is obvious to any legislator whose approval is necessary to
obtain release of the bill from committee, particularly where the
local legislative rules permit secret votes."9
Of course, not all lobbies and pressure groups are equally effective. Groups with lobbying experience tend to be more successful than ad hoc groups, partly because of their familiarity with
the legislative process.90 Moreover, effective action of a lobby or
pressure group requires the cooperation of other lobbies and pressure groups. 91 In short, legislative log-rolling techniques are also
employed by lobby and pressure groups.
How does this knowledge of the legislative process apply to the
problem of reform of tort law? It reveals the incredible naivete of
much judicial language. For example, courts have frequently expressed the idea that any reform in the rule granting charitable
hospitals immunity from tort liability must be made by the legislature. 92 Yet the realities of the legislative process render the
suggested means of reform as unworkable as the most visionary
of utopian schemes. The fortuitous victims of negligence and malpractice of employees of charitable hospitals form no natural or
integrated economic, social, or political group. Moreover, legislation oriented toward the consequences of future events will not
satisfy their demands for redress of past negligence, and they will
not move in an organized fashion along legislative avenues. Alternatively, if an individual legislator should become interested in
the matter, either through personal experience or the experience
of some friend or relative, his proposals would face opposition
from the organized and attentive lobbies of hospitals and insurance companies. Moreover, removal of the immunity of hospitals
might initiate similar action affecting other charities, such as
some churches, that might therefore intervene in behalf of the
89. In only 11 states are committees required to report on all bills. Boox
OF Tim STATES 1962-1963, at 50-51. Crucial committee decisions are usually
made in executive sessions from which the public and press are excluded. See
text accompanying note 48 supra. See also AamscAN STATn LEaisLArunus
102.
90. STEnm &GovE, op. cit. supra note 51, at 48.
91. TRumAN, op. cit. supra note 48, at 363; ZELLER, PRESSURE POLITICS IN
Nw YoRK 230 (1937).
92. E.g., Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1901); Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d S01 (1955);
Knecht v. Saint Mary's Hosp., 892 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958); Memorial
Hosp. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959). But cf. Schute v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp., 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961).
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hospitals. It would indeed be an unusual legislator who, faced
with an organized defense by a group with such immediate appeal, would persist unaided in the battle to remove the immunity.
Even if he organized a group to support the proposed legislation,
that group would be an ad hoc organization unable to engage
in the long run cooperative or log-rolling techniques so essential
to effective legislative action.
Certainly this is but one example of what has been commented
on a number of times: There are no well organized and permanent
lobbies which have a comprehensive interest in the reform of tort
lawP3 Within bar associations, lawyers representing insurance
companies are balanced against those representing injured plaintiffs. The National Association of Compensation Claimant Attorneys (NACCA) might be considered a natural lobby group, but a
review of the recent volumes of its journal fails to disclose any
involvement in legislative reform. On the contrary, the reform
emphasis is on case developments, with the courts viewed as the
reform agency 4 If the NACCA should lobby vigorously for reform, it would undoubtedly suffer not only from a general distrust
of lawyer-proposed legislation but also, turning a phrase that had
political significance, from a profound distrust of the idea that
what is good for the plaintiffs' bar is necessarily good for the law
of torts.
What has been said thus far should not suggest that there are
no organized pressure groups or lobbies with interests in various
problems of tort law. The insurance lobby has been mentioned.
Newspapers, radio, television, and other news media have an obvious interest in the law of defamation. The public lobby, consisting of representatives of state agencies, municipal and county
93. E.g., Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part 11 Judicial Law Making, 64
W. VA. L. RLv. 115, 117-18 (1962); James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the JudicialProcess, 8 BuFFALo L. REv. 315, 384 (1959). See also McKEAx, PRFssuRE ON THE LmISLAuRu
OF NEw Jmsr 52-95 (1938), for a list of
164 interest groups working in the state legislature, none of which would have a
general interest, if indeed any interest, in reform of tort law.
94. See the following editorials by the JouRr,'s Editor-in-Chief, Thomas

Lambert: Goals and Roadblocks in Torts, 28 NACCA LJ. 27 (1962); Views

and Vistas in Torts, 26-207 NACCA LJ. 27 (1961); The Common Law: Stead-

fast and Changing, 25 NACCA LJ. 25 (1960); Touchstones of Tort Liability,
24 NACCA L.J. 25 (1959); Landmarks and New Directions, 23 NACCA LJ.
25 (1959). See also two articles by Dean Pound opposing the establishment
of an automobile accident commission and arguing in favor of judicial treatment of problems of accident loss distribution. Pound, The Proposal of an

Automobile Accident Commission, 25 NACCA LJ. 415 (1960); Pound, Judicial Trial or Administrative Investigation., 24 NACCA LJ. 290 (1959).
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governments, and other public bodies, is interested in proposals
to use their funds to finance a waiver of immunity. A proposal relating to punitive damages generally can be expected to produce
an unusual alliance of the lobbies for organized labor, communication media, and insurance companies. Occasionally the organized interest groups or lobbies may support legislative proposals;
but having accommodated themselves to the existing state of affairs, they probably will seek to preserve the status quo by resisting reform.
The record of adoptions of Model and Uniform acts confirms
what has been said about the role of pressure groups and lobbies
in the legislative process. For example, in 14 years the Uniform
Photographic Copies as Evidence Act has been enacted in a total
of 35 jurisdictions,95 whereas in a considerably longer period the
Uniform Joint Tortfeasors Act has been adopted in only eight jurisdictions.96 Certainly this disparity cannot be explained solely in
terms of draftsmanship or breadth of appeal. The explanation of
the difference in reception seems to lie in the existence of organized
lobbies for insurance companies, banks, and other businesses that
actively sought enactment of the former act for business convenience, and the absence of any organized lobby supporting the
latter act. Similar lack of interest has been demonstrated for
other uniform laws touching on torts,9" while other narrow and
technical uniform acts have achieved a much higher level of adoptions." Indeed, the fact that only four of the 114 uniform and
model acts approved by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws are
95. 9A U.L.A. 158 (Supp. 1962).
96. 9 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1962). There were some objections to the adoption
of § 5 of the act because it was thought to open the way to collusion by an
injured plaintiff and one of several defendants. See the Commissioner's note to
§ 4 of the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 113
(Supp. 1962). But correction of this defect has not accelerated its adoption.
See note 97 infra.
97. The Uniform Single Publication Act, approved in 1952, has had but
eight adoptions, 9C U.LJA. 90 (Supp. 1962); the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, approved 1955, has had but two adoptions, 9 U.L.A. 107
(Supp. 1962); and the Model Nuclear Facilities Act, approved in 1961, has
had no adoptions, 9B U.L.A. 5 (Supp. 1962).
98. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, approved in 1933, has had 39 adoptions, 9C U.L.A. 113 (Supp. 1962); the Uniform Common Trust Fund Act, approved in 1938, has had 30 adoptions, 9 UL.A. 95 (Supp. 1962); the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act, approved in 1940, has had 48 adoptions, 9C U.L.A.
87 (Supp. 1962); the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, approved in 1956, has had
48 adoptions, 9B UJL.A. 39 (Supp. 1962); and the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, approved in 1958, has had S6 adoptions, 9C U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 1962).
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concerned with torts, is itself of some significance in evaluating
the legislative and judicial avenues of reform, It also corroborates
the fact that lobbies and pressure groups are effective in arrogating the attention of legislative service agencies to their particular
fields of interestP9 In short, torts more than many other areas of
private law is neglected in the legislative process and therefore
may more appropriately be considered an area for judicial reform.
VI.- THE POSSIBLE CONT

CT WITH

THE LEGISLATURE
In considering the propriety of revising or overruling some
principle of tort law, should a court give any effect to the factors
mentioned in this summary of legislative realities? Would doing
so smack too much of the practical political considerations that
should be confined to other areas of the governmental process? To
put it another way, lest they overplay their creative role, should
the judges of the highest court of a state feign ignorance of what
any intelligent person can discover about the legislative process
within their state? Or should they, summoning their courage, take
note that while the Emperor does have clothes, some of which
may be beautiful indeed, there are others which are tattered and
full of holes?
One of the arguments that might be made against this realistic
approach to problems of government is that it conflicts with our
democratic faith. In a society dedicated to representative government there is legitimate concern about judicial methods of policymaking. After all, even if elected, judges are not chosen for their
abilities to represent or respond to public pressures.
They are, however,, men trained by their profession to exercise
self restraint. They are certainly capable of distinguishing between the problems that would arise if they acted in conflict with
legislative pronouncements and the problems of action in an area
in which no such conflict exists. The judge who makes that distinction is as responsive to the electorate as the legislature which
enacted the statute. Indeed, to argue that judicial creativity
properly confined to areas where no conflict with representational
determinations exists is contrary to our democratic traditions is
to argue that one of those traditions is itself in conflict with the
others. Quite clearly, the common law today is not what it was at
99. Of. Kernochan, A University Service to Legislation: Columbia!.? Legislative Drafting Research Fund, 16 LA. L. REv. 623, 635 (1956), commenting
on the fund's inability to accommodate all those requesting aid in drafting
proposed legislation.
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the founding of this nation, and the ability of judges to change
and adapt it to different circumstances has been one of the greatest achievements of our judicial system. 00
Where a court makes what appears to be a needed adjustment
in an area in which the legislature has failed to act, that adjustment is not, of course, irreversible. If the judicial reform has provoked sufficient opposition, it is subject to legislative revision or
repudiation. 1 1 The same is true when a court deals with an ambiguous statute, such as one waiving the sovereign immunity of a
state without mentioning the derived immunity of municipali02
ties.
Of course, the forces that will produce a legislative response to
judicial action will be similar to those that produce other legislation. A response is not likely if the judicial reform has not affected
the interests of organized pressure groups and lobbies. In other
words, it will not come because legislators spend their spare time
reading advance sheets to check on how well the court is performing its work. 0 3 When the judicial reform is challenged the lobbies
and pressure groups will, fortunately, bear a burden absent in the
usual legislative situation - that of persuading legislators to
overturn or modify the determination of a respected body of impartial men. Such a catalytic function of the judiciary, producing
legislative consideration of society's needs on matters that no interested group would otherwise question, might well be categorized as an implementation of representative government. It certainly is not opposed to it.
The courts are not unaware of these pragmatic considerations.
In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath °4 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered the question of whether deportation proceedings of the Immigration Service were subject to certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act; those provisions required separation of prosecuting functions from adjudicating
functions. The Court held that the Service was subject to the provisions, saying: °5
100. See notes 2 & 12 supra.
101. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 018
(1962), for a case in which a court specifically notes the possibility of corrective legislative action.
102. See Comment, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 6
WASH. L. REv. 312, 326-27 (1961).
103. Cf. Knecht v. Saint Mary's HIosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958)
(Musmanno, J., dissenting).
104. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
105. Id. at 47.
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The agencies, unlike the aliens, have ready and persuasive access to the
legislative ear and if error is made by including them, relief from Congress is a simple matter.

More directly related; in this respect, to the problem of reform
of tort law is the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.0 " In that case the court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applied to all public bodies within the state, noting that if the legislature deemed
it better public policy, it was free to reinstate the immunity. Also
noted by the court were the possibilities that the legislature might
impose ceilings upon liability or establish administrative requirements preliminary to commencement of suit.
Of even more interest is the recent decision of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.P7 In the
Spanel case the court abolished sovereign immunity as a defense
to the tort liability of school districts, municipal corporations, and
other subdivisions of government. Utilizing the technique of prospective overruling, the court announced that it would apply the
new rule after the next session of the Minnesota Legislature adjourned, subject to any statutes that might then regulate the
prosecution of the claims. Not only did the Minnesota court give
the legislature an opportunity to pass upon the question; it also
suggested a number of procedural and substantive matters that
should be dealt with in such a statute.
In response to Spanel, the Minnesota Legislature restored all
sovereign, immunity for the remainder of 1963. Thereafter the immunity of school and drainage districts is specifically retained another four years, while the immunity of municipalities is, with certain exceptions, removed. These exceptions may be waived if the
municipality obtains liability insurance, but in no other case will
the municipality be liable beyond the monetary limits imposed
08
by the statute
The realistic and ingenious approach to the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature adopted in Spanel was,
perhaps, suggested by recent experiences in other jurisdictions in
which-the courts have overruled immunity doctrines. In Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.,10 9 the Illinois Supreme Court
abandoned the position that school districts enjoy an immunity
from tort liability, implying that the whole doctrine of sovereign
106.
107.
108.
109.

17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
118 N.W.2d 795 (M nn. 1962), 48 Mfn.
Munn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798.
18111. 2d 11, 163 NE.2d 89 (1959).

L. REv. 198 (1903).
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immunity had been abrogated. In the legislative session that followed this decision, four bills were enacted conferring immunity
from tort liability on various governmental subdivisions... and
one bill"' was enacted restoring the immunity of school districts
from liability in excess of 10,000 dollars on each separate cause of
action.
A similar experience occurred in New Jersey following the decision in Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary." 2 In Collopy
the New Jersey Supreme Court overruled the principle that a
charitable corporation was immune from liability for the torts of
its employees. The legislature responded by establishing a general
charitable immunity from liability for what would otherwise be
torts to beneficiaries, but permitting recovery, in tort actions involving not more than 10,000 dollars, from a nonprofit corporation organized exclusively for hospital purposes." 8
More recently, the California Supreme Court discarded the
rule of governmental immunity from tort liability." 4 The legislative response was the adoption of a statute" 5 re-enacting the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it had previously existed, such im110. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 491 (1961) (park districts); ILL.
STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1961) (counties); Im. REv. STAT. ch. 571/2 § 3a
(1961) (forest preserve districts); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 105, § s8sma (1961) (Chicago Park District).
111. ILLi. Rav. STAT. ch. 122, 8 821--31 (1961).
112. 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
113. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-7 to-11 (Supp. 1962).
114. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rep. 89 (1961).
115. CAL. Crv. CODE § 22.3. For a discussion of the problems raised by this
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sequence of events, see Van Alstyne, Govenmental Tort Liability: A Publio
Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 463 (1963).
Editors Notef The California legislature recently enacted a statute
that, with certain exceptions, abolishes sovereign immunity. Cal. Sess.
Laws 1963, ch. 1681. Under the new statute, a public entity is liable
for the injurious acts or omissions of its employees "if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative." Cal. Sess.
Laws 1963, ch. 1681, § 815.2(a). A public employee is liable for his injurious acts or omissions to the same extent that he would be liable as
a private person. Cal. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1681, § 820(a). This liability
is qualified, however, by several provisions, the broadest of which
exempts a public employee, and hence his employer, from liability for
an injury that "was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested
in him, whether or not such discretion be abused." Cal. Sess. Laws 1968,
ch. 1681, § 820.2. This provision seems to encompass the subsequent,
more specific exemptions. Cal. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1681, §§ 820.2-821.8.
Two final sections grant immunity from liability for funds stolen from
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meunity to expire on the ninety-first day after the regular legislative session of 1963. Provision was also made for maintenance of
suits on claims that otherwise would have arisen in the interim.
In short, the legislature gave itself two years to study the problem
and make provisions for tort suits against the state and its subordinate constituents.un
The experiences in Illinois, New Jersey, and California might
be interpreted as rebuffs to reform-minded courts. The rules announced by the courts were not allowed to stand, and the immunities they had overruled were partially reinstated. Yet the Illinois Supreme Court certainly did not consider the legislative
action as a rebuff; instead it adhered to its position in an opinion
filed on rehearing after the legislature had acted, and it was on
sound ground in doing so. The statement of policy of the new
Illinois act," 7 relating to the tort liability of school districts and
nonprofit private schools, refers to "excessive" diversion of school
funds but recognizes that there "should be a reasonable distribution among the members of the public at large of the burden of
individual loss from injuries incurred as a result of negligence in
a non-negligent public employee and for negligent or even intentional
misrepresentations, if the employee was not guilty "of actual fraud,
corruption or actual malice." Cal. Sess. Laws 1963, cl. 1681, §§ 822,
822.2.
116. The Michigan Supreme Court has experienced a period of rather
spasmodic interpretation of local sovereign immunity provisions. In Williams
v. City of Detroit, 364 Mfich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961), an equally divided
court affirmed, on the basis of sovereign immunity, the lower court's dismissal
of a tort claim against the defendant municipality. A majority agreed, however, that the doctrine as applied to maunicipalities should be prospectively
overruled. Four justices, headed by Mr; Justice Edwards, felt that the prospective overruling should have applied to the instant case. Id. at 267-68, 111
N.W.2& at 28-29. Mr. Justice Black wrote a separate opinion in which he
agreed that the lower court's.judgment should be affirmed, but concluded that
municipal corporations should not have the protection of sovereign immunity
in the future. Id. at 287, ltl-N.W.2d at 18. Three justices, headed by Mr.Justice Carr, refused to acquiesce in the overruling of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.

Id. at 249, 111 N.W.2d at 9.

Any hope that the court would abrogate sovereign immunity for all purposes were quashed by the decisions in McDowell v. State Highway Comm'r,
s65- Aich. 268, 112 N.W.2d 491 (1961), in which the court retained the immunity of the State and its departments, and Sayers v. School Dist., 866
Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962), and Stevens v. City of St. Clair Shores,
866 Mich. 341, 115 N.W.2d 69 (1962), two cases in which the court refused
to remove the immunity of school districts. These last three decisions indicate
a retreat from the court's position in Wihiamm, where the court apparently
took positive action in an area of legislative inactivity.
117. Iml,. R y. STAT. ch. 122, § 821 (1961).
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the conduct of school district affairs . . ." During the same legislative session another bill"" was adopted increasing the tort jurisdiction of the Illinois Court of Claims from 7,500 to 25,000 dollars. Similarly, the immunity reinstated in New Jersey was not as
complete as that previously recognized. The final result in California remains to be seen. But in each of the three states the judiciary clearly succeeded in serving as a catalyst, activating the legislature with respect to problems that otherwise would have been
ignored. And in none of them has the court taken a position defiant of an expressed legislative determination.
It has been argued, however, that legislative inaction constitutes a tacit approval of the status quo. According to this view,
judicial creativity in an area in which the legislature has not acted
would amount to defiance of the legislature. The argument is well
represented in a statement of the Oregon Supreme Court on the
doctrine of charitable immunity:"'
Over the years the legislature has taken no action to overturn the doctrine. By its silence, we may well infer its approval. But, however that
may be, there was no occasion for it to act specifically if it was satisfied with the rule. The doctrine had become the firmly established law
of this state; a part of the general public policy of the state relating to
charitable institutions, and as established by the legislature.
The legislature had the right to assume that the rule would not be
changed unless it itself acted.

Obviously this statement is a fine example of what Llewellyn
called the "formal style,' ' 120 but the most striking thing about it is
the way in which it ignores the legislative realities. As the Oregon
court sees it, the legislature is really an assembly of philosopher
kings, gathered to consider the problems of the republic and to
settle matters dispassionately, for the good of society. It does, in
118. ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 87, § 439.8 (D) (1961).
119. Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 493-94,
280 P.2d 301, 303 (1955); cf. Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 889,
108 S.E.2d 388, 396 (1959).
Editors Note: Subsequent to the completion of this Article, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 384 P.2d 1009 (Ore. 1963), rejected its previous approval
of the charitable immunity doctrine, reasoning that "it is neither realistic nor consistent with the common-law tradition to wait upon the
legislature to correct an outmoded rule of case law. . . The fact that
a rule has been followed for fifty years is not a convincing reason why
it must be followed for another fifty years if the reasons for the rule
have ceased to exist." Id. at 1011.
120. LLxwmLYx, THm CommoN LAw TRAD TioN -DEcING
APPEs
88-40 (1960).
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fact, comb through old decisions of the court to see which, if any,
are getting out of adjustment with current values. Legislators will
do this even though much of their time and attention in the short
and hectic legislative sessions is taken by representatives of pressure groups and lobbies. Moreover, though most of them have had
no legal training, they are able to understand, evaluate, and select
for revision or repeal those judicially developed principles that are
no longer productive of justice. And they can do this even though
the rules and their various exceptions are stated, frequently without indicia of doubt, in the complicated, technical jargon of a
learned profession.
In reality, there is no basis for this inference of legislative approval of the existing tort rules, and not all courts draw such an
inference.P' For example, the Michigan court refused to find in
legislative inactivity following decisions under a wrongful death
statute an approval of the judicial interpretations. ' In the view
of the Michigan court, "a legislature legislates by legislating, not
by doing nothing, not by keeping silent!"" Or, as Professor Hart
has pointed out, the Constitution of the United States and each
of the state constitutions prescribe the ways in which bills shall
become law, and failing to enact a bill is not one of them."' Indeed, it is just as reasonable for the legislature to assume that if a
judicially developed rule is unjust the courts will overrule it. And
as Justice Black of the Supreme Court of Michigan demonstrated,
this equally permissible inference has in fact been used by lobbyists in opposing changes in the law of torts."
Where reform bills have been defeated in a legislature, there
may be more reason to infer legislative approval of the status quo.
Some courts have drawn this inference 1 but others have refused
121. E.g., Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 91 Ariz. 35, 369 P.2d 271

(1962).
122. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960); cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946); Park v. Employment Security Comm'n, 355 MIch. 103, 94 N.W.2d 407 (1959).
12S. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 381, 338, 105 N.W2d 118, 121-22

(1960).

124. Hart, Comment on Courts and Law Making, in LEGAL
TomoRiow 40,46 (1959).

INsTiruTim.S

TODAY AND

125. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mch. 231, 273, 111 N.Wed 1, 11

(1961) (opinion of Black, J.).

126. See Martino v. Grace-New RHaven Community Hosp., 146 Conn.735,
148 A2d 259 (1959); Schulte v. Assionaries of La Salette Corp., 352 S.W.2d
636 (Mo.1961).
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to do so.' 2 7 Once again the legislative realities indicate that the
inference may be incorrect either as to the existence of a formulated legislative judgment or as to the reasons why the legislation
failed to pass. Professor Hart's observation is again in point even
if the inference might correctly be drawn as a matter of fact. Likewise, one might infer from limited reforms in a particular area of
tort law that the legislature had determined that no further
changes should be made in the doctrine involved. Yet at least
three courts have refused to draw such an inference within recent
years.128

Of course, in some areas, legislatures may have substituted
comprehensive statutory schemes for common-law tort principles.
For example, the field of labor law was formerly governed by judicially developed tort principles. 29 Presently, federal statutes so
dominate the area that continued judicial creativity would be inappropriate. The inappropriateness is currently stated in the doctrine of federal pre-emption, 18 0 although that doctrine does not
apply to all torts which occur in a labor context.' l Even without
the constitutional basis for the pre-emption doctrine, courts
should refuse to play a creative role. In labor matters there is no
lack of pressure groups or lobbies to initiate action; nor is there indifference on the legislative scene. Legislative policy-making is
preferable in such a context, and judicial policy-making by state
courts is inappropriate.
Excepting these areas where legislation has established a comprehensive scheme, and the specific situations in which the legislature has in fact spoken, recognition of the judiciary's reform
function with respect to the law of torts involves no actual conflict with the legislature. Arguments to the contrary are based on
an artificial view of the legislative process or a rigid and doctrinaire view of the common law. Indeed, as has been pointed out,
127. Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 270

.1958); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1902);
cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 47-48 (1950).
128. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rep. 89 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 INI. 2d
11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 118 N.W.2d
795 (Minn. 1962).
129. See 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 775-816 (1939).
130. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
131. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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judicial activity may well complement the representational system of government, apprising the legislature of matters that
would otherwise be ignored in the turmoil of the legislative process.
VII.

OTHER RESTRAINTS ON ACTIVE
AND OPEN JUDICIAL REFORM
The absence of conflict with either the legislature or the concept of representative government does not of itself require an active and openly creative reform role for the judiciary. The potential gains must be weighed against the benefits to be lost and the
new burdens imposed.
Probably the greatest danger of an active and openly creative
reform role for the judiciary is that it might produce or even facilitate a legislative counterattack by the lobbies and pressure
groups that favor the status quo. There is little reason to believe
that they will not combat both judicial and legislative change
with equal vigor. The same factors that lead to legislative inactivity will result in the absence of countervailing pressure groups
protecting the judicial reform.
If revision is made demonstrably as a function of policy-making, it probably will be easier for lobbies and pressure groups to
convince legislators that they are as competent as judges to make
such decisions. And a rigid statutory solution established by the
lobbyists may easily prove to be more of an inhibition to future
'adjustments than adherence to traditional methods of dealing
with precedent. By Professor Llewellyn's count, there are 64 traditional and impeccable techniques for dealing with precedent.18 2
Even if one were inclined to doubt the separate identity of some
of the listed techniques, one cannot but be impressed by his account of the freedom and mobility which courts have developed
within traditional limits and accordingly hold fears that this
mobility might be lost under a statutory scheme.
Mr. Justice Cardozo recognized the potential of these techniques for accomplishing reform and the inhibiting influence that
legislation might exert:
Time was when the remedial agencies, though inadequate, were at least
in

our own hands. Fiction and equity were tools which we could apply

and fashion -for ourselves. The artifice was clumsy, but the clumsiness
was in some measure atoned for by the skill of the artificer. Legisla-

tion, supplanting fiction and equity, has multiplied a thousand fold the
power and capacity of the tool, but it has taken the use out of our own
hands and put it in the hands of others.lss
132. LLEwEmyw, op. cit. supra note 120, at 77-91.
133. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 85 HAnv. L. REv. 11S (1921).
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His opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." 4 is some measure of his ability to accomplish a major reform while insisting
throughout an avowedly uncreative opinion that the result was
dictated by a principle drawn from earlier cases, a good number
of which were in a very practical way overruled. If Justice Cardozo had expressly stated a judicial responsibility for active and
creative reform and then announced as the latest policy judgment the rule of manufacturers' liability for negligently made
products, manufacturers' associations might have successfully
sponsored an undesirable legislative response.
The danger of statutory intrusions depriving courts of the flexibility they possess in its absence can be overstated. As Gray
pointed out several times in his classic work,188 quoting Bishop
Hoadly, judges make the final determination of the meaning of a
statute. They may exercise this power more than once, by changing an earlier court's interpretation of the statutory language.180
For present purposes, a perverse exercise of this power may be
found in the treatment that a number of state courts have given
constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing suits against
the state.137 A much more severe test of a court's ability to interpret a statute without invoking legislative retaliation - perhaps
the most severe test - can be found in those cases in which courts
issued an injunction in a labor dispute on the basis of the preamble of a statute designed to prevent the issuance of such injunctions.3 8 The presence of opposing pressure groups, however,
may have made the venture less risky than an equally cavalier
treatment of legislation that had strong supporters and no opponents.
Certainly, the judicial tendency to construe statutes strictly
rather than analogize from their provisions has been demonstrated more than adequately. 80 On the other hand, a court may
184. 217 N.Y. s82, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
135. GRAY, TnE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 102, 125, 171-72 (ed
ed. 1921).
136. E.g., Park v. Employment Security Comm., 355 Mich. 103, 04
N.W.2d 407 (1959); Windust v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d
83, 323 P.2d 241 (1958).
137. See Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L.
1Ev. 1363, 1365 (1954).
138. Roth v. Local 1460, Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 303, 24 N.E.2d
280 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ind. 275, 81 N.E.2d 986 (1941); Gazzam v. Building Serv. Employees, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P.2d 97 (1947); cf.
Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
139. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in EAnvARD LEGAL EssAYs 213 (1934).
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utilize a statute as the base for a creative venture; for example the
United States Supreme Court recently announced that the Federal Employers Liability Act created only a framework within
which the courts were left to evolve, much in the manner of the
common law, a system of principles to compensate injured employees consistent with the changing realities of the railroad
industry. 40 In short, courts can remain creative even while working within a statutory scheme.
Assuming that courts can and do withstand the counterattack
on their reforms, they face problems within their own walls.
Having acknowledged their creative role, they should expect a response from those with an interest in producing change. The organized interests that function as legislative lobbies might well
undertake experimental litigation to produce changes consistent
with their objectives. If the appellate court might play its creative role in any case coming before it, interest groups may well
conclude that they cannot ignore pending cases involving principles of law important to them. At the present time such groups
do participate as amici in significant cases, but only where the
significance of the case appears from the lack of controlling precedent or the convergence of conflicting precedents in the context of
the pending case. Unless the courts develop some signaling device,
such as setting the case for re-argument and inviting amicus
briefs, they can expect an increase in the applications to participate as amicus. Even with the use of such a device, as case reports indicate,' 4 ' courts will receive what they might consider the
mixed blessing of numerous briefs and oral arguments. While the
matter rests within their control, it is unlikely that courts would
want to refuse such assistance in the new role they have openly
assumed.
If the courts undertake a creative role, they can expect pressure for changes in the rules of evidence. Much of the evidence
that is inadmissible as irrelevant under existing rules might be
relevant to the consideration of a change in the rules. The size of
records might increase significantly, as those using the litigation
process experimentally attempt to build the proper record, with
data drawn from other disciplines and professions, for the policy
140. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 437 (1958).
141. For example, in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mfich. 231, 111
N.W.2d 1 (1961) the court received seven amicus curiae briefs, and in Spancl

v. Mounds View School Dist., 118 N.W. 2d 795 (Mamn. 1962) ten amici
curiae participated-
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decision they will urge upon the court. 14 2 To a certain extent, the
problem can be avoided by liberal use of the technique of judicial notice. Not all relevant information and analysis, however,
appear in available printed form. Again, the problem is within the
control of the court, but the pressure to receive all volunteered
information relevant to the policy decision will be difficult for a
non-investigatory body to withstand.
Another facet of the total problem presented by a creative judicial role is that of dealing with ex parte communications. If the
function of the judiciary is to ensure the correct application of the
appropriate rules of law to the facts of a case, improper communications concerning these facts may be quite easily prohibited. If the courts affirmatively assume a policy-making role, however, what is the status of non-record communications made by a
nonparty and not directed to the facts of a particular case but of
great importance in establishing a policy that the communicator
supports? Lord Mansfield has been commended for consulting
with experts in the practices of merchants, but it is far from certain that present-day judges would not be censured for private
discussions with economists, psychiatrists, or sociologists. The
problem has been a major one for administrative agencies which
possess both adjudicatory and rule-making powers. 143
VIII. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Having surveyed some of the pros and cons of an actively creative role for the judiciary in the reform of tort law, a summary of
the relative strengths and weaknesses of legislatures and courts as
reform agencies is appropriate.
As the above discussion shows, there is a remarkable dearth
of legislative incentive to consider or initiate reforms of tort law.
A conscientious judge, on the other hand, might easily consider it
one of his professional obligations. While legislatures have the
power, and sometimes even the means, to investigate the relevant
factors underlying a policy decision, their utilization of the
existing facilities is extremely unlikely. No empirical data is available for some problems and for others the available data can be
obtained without the use of legislative investigatory powers. On
the other hand, courts have no investigatory powers to facilitate
142. Cf. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929);
F mNr

, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 86-92 (1949).

143. See Peck, Regulation and Control of Ex Parte Communications with
Administrative Agencies, 76 H[ARv. L. REV. 233 (1962).
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the accumulation of data relating to policy decisions, except as
they might provide power to litigants by-relaxing the evidentiary
rules of relevance. Moreover, court records unfortunately stop
short at the rendition of a judgment and are barren of information on how the determination made subsequently affected the
parties and society. The necessity of maling occasional policy decisions without adequate supporting data often produces a judicial tendency to ignore pertinent empirical data. But frequent encounters with a general problem, presented in various contexts
that an endless variety of fact patterns provides, give courts a
type of experimental program in which they can formulate and
test a governing rule.'4 Moreover, their experience with jury refusals to apply the rules propounded by trial judges gives them
some basis for determining whether the rules are compatible with
the current values of society. Thus, courts have recently commented on the unacceptability of the rule by which contributory
negligence bars recovery 45 and the rule limiting a parent's recov4
ery for the wrongful death of a child to pecuniary losses.1
If the comparison is made on the basis of what has in fact been
done to accumulate data, as opposed to what could be done,
courts compare quite favorably with legislatures. As Professor
Leon Green has said,147 courts know more of the history of the
law, and thus probably more of what departure from an estabblished rule involves, than a legislature knows or can learn.
Courts certainly equal legislatures in the ability to appraise the
rationale of an existing rule. Particularly is this so in those areas
where the need for reform has produced a host of irrational and
unworkable distinctions, impressive and even awe-inspiring to
laymen as an elaborate and complicated structure built by a
learned profession, but without merit or justification to those who
understand the problem. Not surprisingly, it is in these areas that
144. For an excellent example of an experimental enlargement and subsequent contraction of liability for negligent infliction of emotional harm, see
the line of cases set out in GnEnony & KAwLv, CASES AND MATEILS oN
TORTS 860-83 (1959). The principal cases in order are: Victorian Ry. Comm'ns
v. Coultas, [1888] 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.); Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2
KB. 669; Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 KJB. 141 (C-.A); Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394 (CA.); Bourlill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92; King
v. Phillips [1953] 1 Q.B. 429 (CA.).
145. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
146. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Allnn. 847, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1961), 47 lmm'.
L. Rlv. 3e3 (1962).
147. Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part I1 Judicial Law Making, 64
W. VA. L. Rtv. 117, 121 (1962).
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couAs have recently been most active in making reforms. 4 " In
making such appraisals they have the benefit of the extensive literature of the profession and, unlike legislators, a physical and social environment conducive to scholarly pursuits. Indeed, the extent to which judges have relied on law review commentary and
scholarly treatises when undertaking a reform14 is probably one
of the greatest reassurances that can be given to those who wonder whether their literary products have a value equal to the pain
of their labors.
Changes in substantive rules may affect the important relationship between the trial judge and jury.15° In this area, courts
are clearly superior to legislatures in the ability to determine the
likelihood of such an effect and its desirability.
The proponents of legislation frequently are interested in maximizing only one value and may neglect others which assume
148. See, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 349 P.2d
457, 11 Cal. Rep. 89 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 90 So. 2d 180
(Fla. 1957) (municipal immunity from tort liability); Spanel v. Mounds View
School Dist., 118 N.W.Rd 795 (Minn. 1962); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear
Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 287,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (liability for injury from negligently
induced fright); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d
3 (1957) (immunity of charitable hospitals); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17
Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); cf. President & Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See also Schulte v.
Missionaries of La Salette Corp., 352 S.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Mo. 1961) (noting
that the jurisdictions in which charitable immunity has recently been rejected
were jurisdictions in which that immunity was not complete).
149. See, e.g., Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rep. 97 (1962); Muskopf
v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Hargrove v.
Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kancland Community Unit Dist., 18 1ll. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Eick v. Perk Dog
Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 298, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md.
578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111
N.W.2d 1 (1961) (opinion of Black, J.); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J.
172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J.
29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767 (Wash.
1962); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
Judges have commented directly on the importance of an informed professional criticism. CxADozo, THE GROWTH or Tm LAW 12 (1924); ScuamFFn,
PRECEDENT AND POLICY 12 (1956). As might be expected, the critical views of
the scholars are given greatest weight when the scholarly opinion is unanimous or nearly unanimous while precedents point in all directions. Cf. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
150. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAlv. L. Rsv.
468, 500-03 (1962).
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equal importance in varying factual contexts. The protection
given insurers from fraudulent claims by host-guest statutes is
an apt example. Indeed, if a statute incorporates a number of
values and principles, it is likely to amount to no more than a general delegation of power which does not effectively control judicial
decisions. Because of this, the legislative treatment of torts carries no guarantee of a reasoned and consistent approach to the
problems of compensation and loss distribution. Courts, on the
other hand, are constantly presented arguments based on comparison and analogy, and for that reason, may produce a more
balanced jurisprudential approach.
On the other hand, the flexibility of the legislative technique
can be put to good use. Statutory limits on the amount of recovery can be used to balance the value of compensating an injured
party against the value of preventing excessive diversion of funds
or crushing liabilities. 51 The legislative technique may provide
the administrative machinery to carry out an established program. Thus, a compulsory automobile liability or loss insurance
program can be established legislatively with the necessary administrative support in the licensing of vehicles and drivers, as
well as the police supervision of their operation. Judicial expansion of the insurance principle must rely, however, on the selfexecuting effect of newly adopted rules which induce persons to
purchase insurance to avoid liabilities.
The legislative approach to reform has the advantage of a possible statement of all the ramifications and consequences of the
change made, whereas the traditional judicial approach may
leave the full extent and significance of the change in doubt until
another case presents the opportunity to consider another variation of the problem. But this limitation on judicial reform can be
overstated. Thus, the day that the Supreme Court of California
decided Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist.,15 2 abrogating the rule of
governmental immunity in that state, it also decided Lipman v.
Brisbane Elementary School Dist.,1" establishing a rule of nonliability for certain discretionary acts of governmental officials.
This court also announced on the same day, two new rules creating
inter-spousal liability for both negligent 1 4 and intentional torts.151
151. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
152. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 Phed 457, 11 Cal. Rep. 89 (1961).
153. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 859 Pad 465, 11 Cal. Rep. 97 (1961).
154. Klein v.lein, 376 P.ad 70,26 Cal. Rep. 102 (1962).
155. Self v. Self, 376 P.Rd 65, 26 Cal. Rep. 97 (1962).
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The Supreme Courts of Florida 16 and Wisconsin' 57 did not enjoy
the presence of such parallel cases when they decided cases abolishing the immunity of municipal corporations, but both found it
possible to discuss the limitation of their new rules with respect
to legislative and judicial acts of officials. The Wisconsin court
distinguished between "governmental immunity from torts and
the sovereign immunity of the state from suit"' 5 8 and concluded
that its decision had no effect on "the state's sovereign right under
the Constitution to be sued only upon its consent." 5 9
Another advantage of the legislative technique of reform is
that it can be given only future effect, thus avoiding what is generally considered undesirable: retroactive change in the law. Judicial reform is traditionally considered retroactive in effect, subjecting conduct to a rule of law that was not in existence when
that conduct occurred. Of course, as has been frequently recognized, 60 the area of torts is largely an area of accidental loss
where the objection of retroactivity is entitled to less consideration than in other contexts.
Perhaps the most serious objection is raised by those who
claim they did not obtain liability insurance because of their reliance on a former rule that provided immunity from liability. Insurers could claim that the rates they charge for liability insurance are based on the prior rules governing liability and that
156. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
157. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1902).
158. Ibid.
159. Id. at 38, 115 N.W.2d at 626. If this language refers to the United
States Constitution, it is much too broad; the eleventh amendment precludes
actions unconsented to against states in a federal court, but it does not grant
immunity from similar actions in state courts. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI; see
Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 842 U.S. 299 (1952); Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 469 (1945); Dunnuck v. Kansas State
Highway Comm'n, 21 F. Supp. 882 (D.C. Kan. 1937); Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Murphy, 207 S.C. 324, 35 S.E.2d 586 (1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 408 (1940). In
the context of its earlier discussion of the applicable provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution, however, a more reasonable interpretation of the court's
statement would limit it to the state constitution. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625-26 (1962).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.,
118 N.W.2d 795, 803 (Minn. 1962), also left its abolition of sovereign immunity open to statutory modification. The Spanel court alluded to the state's
constitutional right of sovereign immunity, without distinguishing between
suits in state and federal courts. This is clearly an improper construction of
the eleventh amendment and is contrary to the great weight of authority.
See 48 Mn. L. Rnv. 198, 203 (1963).
160. See note 14 nsupra.
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change will inflict losses on them by requiring payments over and
above those for which provision was made. What studies have
been made, however, indicate that details of the substantive law
governing liability play but a small and frequently undetectable
part in the total costs of providing liability insurance. 3 '

While legislatures can give statutes only a prospective effect,
they do not always do so, and when they do, the statutory language is not always clear and explicit. 62 In this respect the legislative product should be judged by what it is and not by what it
might have been. On the other hand, in recent years a number of
courts have put the device of prospective overruling to effective
use in making reforms in the tort area.0 3 The technique of applying the new rule in the case in which it is announced, as a reward
for ingenuity of counsel, while giving it only prospective opera-

tion as to other cases is certainly questionable."" The adequacy
161. Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process- The Insignifcance of Foresight,70 YALEi LJ. 554 (1961); Peck, Comparative Negligence
and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MrcH. L. Rv. 689 (1960).
162. E.g., compare Denning v. Quist, 160 Wash. 681, 290 Pac. 145 (1931),
and Robinson v. McHugh, 158 Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (1930) (both giving
retroactive effect to a legislatively enacted immunity), with Hammack v.
Monroe St. Lumber Co., 54 Wash. 2d 224, 339 P.2d 684 (1959), 35 Wvsu.
L.

Rlv. 237

(1960) (holding that a statute removing the same immunity was

not retroactive in effect). See also Nogosek v. Truedner, 54 Wash. 2d 906,
344 P.2d 1028 (1959) for an example of legislative failure to state whether a
change in a host-guest statute had only prospective effect.
163. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.Rd 201 (Alaska 1902); Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 NM.T2d 89 (1959);
Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W2d 1 (1901); Parker
v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (Mlnn. 1962); Witte v. Fullerton, 376
P.2d 244 (Okla. 1962); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962); Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d
131, 292 (1961); cf. Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 329 S.W.2d 14
(Mo. 1959) (prospective change of a procedural rule). The leading case on
prospective overruling is Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.,
287 U.S. 358 (1932) (Cardozo, J.), which involved administrative regulation of the rates of a common carrier rather than a problem of tort law.
Pure prospective overruling differs from a more familiar judicial technique,
the warning dictum, only in the firmness of the commitment expressed to
apply a new rule in future cases. E.g., compare Puhl v. M lwaukee Auto
Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), with Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, supr, and Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., supra. The leading article on
prospective overruling is Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. Pv. 1 (1960). See also Note, Prospective Overruling
and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 Yrxn. L. 907 (1962).
164. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1902); Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Il. 2d 11, 163 N.E-2d 89 (1959);
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of notice of a new rule that becomes effective as of the date the
opinion is filed is similarly doubtful. 6 5 But some courts have provided a substantial notice period by stating a future date as of
which the newly announced rule will become effective. 10 Despite
questions or refinement of technique in the use of the device, judicial use of prospective overruling can eliminate any supposed superiority of the legislature as an instrument of reform insofar as
avoidance of retroactivity is concerned.
IX.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

At this point it is appropriate to attempt an appraisal of the
comparative abilities of courts and legislatures to deal with some
specific problems in the field of torts. Foremost among these problems is that of how society should deal with the tremendous losses
occasioned by automobile accidents. The indications are that
greater reliance on loss distribution through insurance is in order
and that fault as a basis for recovery must be abandoned.T Here,
as with many other tort problems, the victims of automobile accidents are poorly organized and not likely to operate effectively
as lobbyists, while the opponents of revision are. The breadth of
the problem and its impact in all strata of society give some
hope for legislative attention, but the possibilities of compreBrowning v. Paddock, 364 Mich. 293, 111 N.W.2d 45 (1961); Parker v. Port
Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,
17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d
367, 107 N.W.2d 131, 292 (1961).
165. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962); Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N2E.2d 89 (1959);
Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1900); Kojis v.
Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, 292 (1961).
166. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962)
(close of the next session of the state legislature); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (40 days after filing of
opinion).
167. ERRENSWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1954); GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958); CoMMITEE TO STUDY CONPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO
T

COLuImBIA UNivERsrrY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(1932); James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process,
8 BUFFALO L. REv. 315, 332-40 (1959); Marx, Compensation Insurance for
Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for Compulsory Auto Compensation Isurance, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 134 (1954); Morris & Paul, The Financial
Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962).
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hensive legislative action are slight. Moreover, the amount of
empirical research available to courts is impressive and convincing. 6 s Nevertheless, the necessity of establishing administrative
machinery to carry out an insurance program and check on compliance with its requirements puts this hoped-for reform beyond
the limits of judicial creativity. As Professor James has suggested,'6 9 courts must limit their reforms to changes of tort doctrine that give emphasis to the concepts of compensation and
loss distribution.
As an illustration of how courts may do this, consideration may
be given to the family car doctrine. 7 0 Using their understanding
of the doctrine and its fictional basis, courts should not hesitate
to extend the liability to corporations or other owners of vehicles
that cannot be characterized as the head of a household.'7 And
the extension of the doctrine to dangerous instruments such as
powerboats, motor cycles, and mechanically powered "mountain
goats," etc." 2 is obviously a task that the courts must perform
if the extension is to be made in most jurisdictions.
Courts may function effectively as reform agents in re-evaluating the various judicially created immunities from liability, such
as sovereign immunity, charitable immunity, and the various
family immunities. There is little reason to expect that organized
pressure groups will be formed to lobby reform legislation through
to enactment of statutes affecting any of these doctrines. On the
other hand, organized pressure groups are active and effective in
preventing their consideration by the entire legislature. The
courts, however, are as competent as the legislatures to reappraise
the rationale that supports the continued existence of these doctrines. Each consists of an elaborate, technical, and complicated
formulation that impresses laymen as the product of a learned
168. HuN=G & NEuWmTH, WHo SuEs n NEw YonK Crr? (1902);
Adams, A Comparative Analysis of Costs of Insuring Against Losses Due to
Automobile Accidents, Economic and Business Bulletin (Temple University),
farch, 1960, p. 1; Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 CoLmT.
L. I~v. 1 (1961); Morris & Paul, supra note 167. A list of earlier studies is
set lorth in James, supranote 167, at 828-209.

169. James, supra note 167, at 334.
-170. See Pnoss=n, TORTS 368-72 (2d ed. 1955); Lattin, Vicarious Liability
and the Family Automobile, 26 MicH. L. REv. 846 (1928).
171. Compare Keller v. Federal Bob Brannon Truck Co., 151 Tenn. 427,
269 S.W. 914 (1925), with Durso v. A. D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20
A.2d 392 (1941), and Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 188 At. 365 (1927).
172. But see Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Amn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932);
Menhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929).
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profession - a product that should not be disturbed by the uninformed. There is, moreover, little hope that legislative investigations could produce much empirical data, beyond that available to the judiciary, on which to base a judgment as to the
desirability of retaining the immunity.
Insofar as sovereign immunity is concerned the legislature can
make the appropriate provisions regarding notice of claims, special periods of limitations for the filing of suits, trial without a
jury, possible monetary limits on liability, negotiation of settlements and compromises, and the budgeting and appropriation
procedures to be followed.1' But these, as the California and
Minnesota experiences indicate,'17 4 can also be produced by the
legislature after the courts have played their creative role and
directed legislative attention to a question that would otherwise
be ignored. Finally, at least with respect to sovereign immunity
and charitable immunity, the view of the scholars is that as
75
presently recognized in most jurisdictions, they are indefensible.1
The doctrine of comparative negligence should replace the
absolute bar imposed by the contributory negligence rule, and
this substitution should be made by the judiciary. The present
173. Indeed, the Washington statute waiving sovereign immunity, WASH.
REv. CODE § 4.92.090, was apparently enacted without hearings. H.R. 338,
from which the statute comes, was introduced in the House on January 30,
1961, and referred to the Committee on Judiciary-Civil. JOURNAL OF0 T119
WASHINGTON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 184 (1961). Three days later, on

February 2, 1961, the Committee reported favorably on the bill. JOURNAL
OF THE WASHINGTON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 235 (1961). The report
was so short and cryptic as to be uninformative to the uninitiated. Note 50
supra. The bill was received in the Senate on February 9, 1961, and referred
to the Judiciary Committee. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON SENATE 313, 315
(1961). Nineteen days later it was reported favorably to the Senate in a
report as cryptic and uninformative as that of the House Committee on
Judiciary-Civil. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON SENATE 740 (1961). The only

recorded discussion of the bill occurred in the Senate, which first adopted
and then, upon reconsideration, refused to adopt an amendment giving the
statute retroactive effect. The proponent of the amendment stated he had
no idea of how many pending claims might be affected by adoption of the
amendment. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON SENATE 1010-12 (1961).
As enacted, the statute contained no provision respecting the immunity
of municipalities, leaving its effect in that respect a matter of conjecture. Nor
were any provisions made concerning notice of claims, filing of suits, or methods of payment. A statute enacted in 1963 now provides that detail. Wash.
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 159.
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.3; Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798.
175. 2 HARPER & J wns, THE LAw OF TORTS 1612 n.13, 1667 n.2 (1956);

PROSSER, TORTS 774 n.42 (1955). See also President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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comparative negligence rule followed in Georgia originated in a
series of common-law decisions of the Georgia court during the
1850's, and that court's construction of subsequently enacted
legislation codifying those decisions' 7 8 In Illinois, a limited form
of comparative negligence, based on a distinction between gross
and slight negligence, was judicially adopted in 185817 and ultimately abandoned, also by judicial decision, in 1894.118 The
significance of the abandonment is not that comparative negligence is unsound-for the abandonment was probably caused by
the difficulties of working with such nebulous concepts as gross
and slight negligence as well as the dissatisfaction with a rule
that served only to transfer the entire loss to one party-but
that such changes were made by courts, rather than legislatures,
at a time when the creative role of the judiciary was not as well
understood as at the present time.
It is unlikely that sufficient support for a comparative negligence rule could be organized to obtain its passage through a
state legislature. 7 9 As in other areas appropriate for judicial
reform, lobby and pressure groups are active and successful in
preventing bills incorporating comparative negligence principles
from obtaining full legislative consideration 80 Judicial experience with jury verdicts provides the courts with ample proof
that the contributory negligence rule is not compatible with the
176. The better discussions of this development are found in Philbrick,
Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, 99 U. PA. L. ]tEv. 766 (1951);
Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cmi.-KEnr L. Rav. 304
(1950).

177. Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 IMI. 478 (1858).
178. City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163, 38 NXE. 892 (1894).
179. Arkansas adopted a comparative negligence statute in 1955, Ark.
Acts 1955, No. 199, amended by Ark. Acts 1957, No. 296. For its present
form see ARx- STAT. §§ 27-1730.1, 27-17302 (1962).
180. According to a list compiled in 1951, comparative negligence legislation has been introduced in the following sixteen states: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. Lipscomb, Comparative Negligence, 1951 Ils. L.J. 667, 674. It has failed
of enactment in all but Arkansas. Note 179 supra. Subsequent efforts to enact
such legislation have failed. S. 460, 35th Reg. Sess. (1957) (Washington);
H.R. 40, 35th Reg. Sess. (1957); S. 352, 33d Reg. Sess. (1953); H.. 28,
32d Reg. Sess. (1951); Averbach, Comparative Negligence Legislation A
Cure for Our Congested Courts, 19 Axn.wy L. Rnv. 4, 13 (1955) (New York);
Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Nee&d Law
Reform, 11 U. F" L. Rav. 135, 136 n.5 (1958) (Florida); OToole, Comparative Negligence: The Pennsylvania Proposal, 2 VmL. L. Rev. 474 (1957)
(Pennsylvania); Note, 25 Foamnaha L. REv. 185 nn.5, 6 & 7 (1956) (New
York); 8 ALA. L. Ray. 71 (1955) (Alabama).
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values of our society, 8 ' and it has been abandoned in most
common-law jurisdictions outside the United States.8 2 Moreover, scholars almost unanimously agree that a comparative
negligence standard is a workable and more just scheme than
the contributory negligence rule. 8 For these reasons a number
of important voices have recently and quite properly urged that
courts make the change to comparative negligence without waiting for legislative action. 8 4
Moreover, empirical data bearing upon the subject is as available to courts as it is to legislatures and their committees. Probably the most important consideration is the effect that such a
change would have upon the operations of insurance companies.
Few others could justifiably claim to have made commitments
and taken action in reliance upon the existence of a rule by which
contributory negligence bars recovery. What evidence there is

indicates that a change in the rule would have a minimal and
perhaps undiscernible effect on the total operations of insurers.'
181. Karcesky v. Laria, 882 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955).
182. Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 333, 337-38 (1932); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mxcmi. L. REV.
465, 466 (1953).
183. GREGORY,

LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION

IN NEGLIGENcE ACTIONS

4 (1936); MORRIS, TORTS 215 (1953); WMLLAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTnmUTORY NEGLIGENCE, 259 (1951); James, Comparative Negligence, 26 UTAH
B. BULL. 109 (1956); James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE LJ. 691,
Forgotten
704-05 (1953); Malone, Comparative Negligence -Louisiana's
Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125, 142-47 (1945); Maloney, supra note 180, at 173;
Philbrick, supra note 176, at 572; Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA
L.J. 195, 197 (1954); Prosser, supra note 182, at 508; Turk, supra note 176,
at 841-45.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States,
said about the two rules in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 40809 (1953):
The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly barred an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modem admiralty policy and practice. Exercising its
traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and now follows its own
fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires.
184. SFAVY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS 55-56 (1954); Keeton, supra note
150, at 506-09. The same suggestion was made in the 1962 Ross Prize Essay.
Gilliam, How May the Disposition of Personal Injury Litigation Be Improved?, 48 A.BA.J. 834, 836 (1962).
185. Morris, supra note 161, at 554; Peck, supra note 161, at 689. Compare
Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89, 108 (1959) concluding that adoption of a comparative negligence standard allowed plaintiffs to win a higher proportion of cases,
but not to obtain larger verdicts. Indeed, directing the attention of the jury
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The apparent explanation of this fact is that comparative negligence is in fact the standard by which parties negotiate settlements. 86
' The proportion of cases controlled by a judgment,
which may involve as little as two percent of all claims, 87 is too
small to affect the overall result even if juries did conscientiously
'follow the instructions given them. Other concerns, such as the
extent to which a contributory negligence rule deters risk-creating conduct, is something that probably cannot be tested empirically because appropriate laboratory experiments cannot be
practiced on human beings and the variables affecting the accident rate are so numerous that no effect can be attributed to
the presence of a comparative negligence rule.
Finally, the involved and convoluted features of the last clear
chance doctrine seem to ameliorate what would otherwise appear
to be the harsh consequences of a rule barring recovery on the
basis of contributory negligence. They provide for the layman
the appearances of a system carefully designed to work justice
between the parties to accident litigation. To judges and members of the legal profession, of course, the doctrine represents
nothing more than an illogical scheme, difficult to apply, and
frequently impossible to justify, the existence of which is tolerated only because it permits courts to escape the harsh consequences of the contributory negligence rule. As elsewhere, such
doctrinal complications not only establish the need for reform;
they also establish the propriety of judicial action.
Changes in the common-law rules respecting the right to contribution as well as the effect of a release given one tort-feasor
on claims against others have also been pointed out as changes
that courts might appropriately make. 8 There may be some
doubts on the merits of permitting one tort-feasor to enforce
a right to contribution against another 8 9 If changes in the rule
to the possibility of deducting some portion of the plaintiff's damages as
attributable to his fault may well have the effect of reducing the amount of
the verdict from what it would have been under a rule by which plaintiff's
negligence should only have the effect of a complete bar.
186. A study indicated that 84% of all those who made claims arising
out of accidents in New York City received some compensation, leading the
authors to conclude that the present liability rules prevent recovery by a
maximum of 25% of all potential claimants, and that recoveries could be
achieved in cases of doubtful liability. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note
168, at 1s, 84.
i87. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, supra note 168, at 10.
18"8. SEnVEY, COGITA.TIONS oN Toa'Ts 54 (1954).
189. James,. Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criti-

cism, 54

HAav.

L. R-v. 1156 (1941).
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are to be made, once again the lack of organized legislative
lobbies to support such reforms, the presence of aged doctrines
with elaborate distinctions, and the equality of access to empirical data indicate that the judiciary is an appropriate agency
for reform.
In recent years courts have undertaken a creative role in
enlarging the scope of liability for fright and emotional shock
as well as for invasion of privacy.' 90 Appraisal of the comparative abilities of courts and legislatures to deal with the problems
leads to the conclusion that the courts have acted properly in
doing so. Again the disorganized state of the victims of conduct
producing such results and the consequent lack of organized
lobbies seeking remedial legislation provide one rational explanation for legislative inattention to the problem.' 9' Legislative
investigations might produce empirical data concerning the frequency with which such conduct occurs, but they probably could
supply little information bearing upon the crucial question of
whether a particular victim should be compensated. A legislative
investigation could conceivably be directed toward determining
the increased incidence of fraudulent claims accompanying liberalization of the right of recovery, but the techniques used to
determine whether particular claims were fraudulent would necessarily parallel those used by the courts to determine the validity of claims. Moreover, courts are familiar with the trial process
and are in a position to formulate subsidiary rules, relating to
92
the burden of proof and procedure, to deal with the problem.
Finally, the pre-existing law was filled with technicalities, such
as the requirement of some physical contact with the victim, or
190. PROSSER, TORTS 38-47, 635-44 (2d ed. 1955). For recent examples,
see Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1961); Battalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). But see Amaya
v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rep. 33 (1903)
denying recovery to a mother for harm caused by fright and nervous shock
suffered when she saw defendant's negligently operated truck run over her
infant child.
191. Thus the New York Revision Commission filed a report in 1936
urging adoption of legislation that would allow the courts to impose liability
for physical and mental injuries occasioned by negligently induced fright, with
the courts working out the rules which would protect meritorious claimants
and prevent the successful prosecution of non-meritorious or fraudulent claims.
NEw YORK LAW REvIsIoN ComVm'x, REPORT 381-82 (1930). The report ap-

parently gathered much dust but little support until utilized by the Court of
Appeals in reaching its decision in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 239, 170
N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
192. See Naw YORK LAw RsvisioN Commx'N, REPORT 381-82 (1930).
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that the victim, though untouched, had been within the area of
risk of harm from physical contact, or that substantial damages
for such harm could be awarded as a parasitic incident of the
right to recover on some other tort theory. Similar reasons might
be advanced to support the creative role that courts have played
in recent years in permitting recovery for prenatal injuries.103
Though the courts have performed well in the last two areas,
they have been woefully inadequate in responding to the call
for the reform of principles affecting the liability of landowners
and land occupiers. Again, unorganized victims of harm that
might have been avoided through the use of no more than reasonable care have no lobby to press the case for expanded rights
of recovery. On the other hand, apartment house owners in particular, and business organizations in general, do have active
lobbies to prevent legislative consideration of the problem. MIoreover, the program of expanding liabilities is politically unpalatable for legislators, most of whom would quickly realize that its
support would likely require them to defend against the charges
that these organized groups would press. In politics it is frequently more advantageous to be on the offensive than the
defensive, regardless of the merits of the proposition.
That the area is one in need of reform can hardly be doubted.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said of the commonlaw rules governing land-occupiers' liabilities:'9
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee
and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a
culture which traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism.
In an effort to do justice in an industrialized society, with its complex
economic and individual relationships, modem common-law courts have
found it necessary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements,
to create subclassifications among traditional common-law categories,
and to delineate fine gradations in the standards of care which the
landowner owes to each. Yet even within a single jurisdiction the classifications and subclassifications bred by the common law have produced
confusion and conflict. As new distinctions have been spawned, older
ones have become obscured. Through this semantic morass the common
law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, toward imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances.
193. PRossER, ToRTS 174-75 (2d ed. 1955); Note, Prenatal Injury, 38
WAsir. L. IRtv. 390 (1963). For a recent decision with a good discussion of
the problem, see Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d
163 (1959).

19-. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,

630-31 (1959).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:205

These proliferating technicalities, which the Supreme Court
wisely refused to incorporate into admiralty law, are exactly the
type that impress laymen and obscure from legislators the trend
that the law is and should be following. On the other hand, a
court may easily emulate Justice Cardozo in his famous MaoPherson decision 95 and draw from the various exceptions to
nonliability the governing principle that owners and occupiers
have a single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances.19
Another area in which the courts have not been as responsive
to the changing conditions of society is in the law of damages.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Michigan abandoned the rule
by which the damages awarded parents for the wrongful death
of a child are measured by the pecuniary loss to the parentsthat is, the difference between his probable wages during minority
less the costs of his upkeep. 9 7 Labeling its earlier precedents a
"remote and repulsive backwash of time and civilization, untouched by the onward march of society," the court attempted
to adapt the rule to what it knew juries had in fact been practicing covertly. Earlier, the Supreme Court of Mississippi had
brought its law of damages into conformance with general standards by removing the established denial of recovery for mental
suffering experienced either as a result of physical disfigurement,
or after physical pain had ceased. 98 But on the whole, courts,
and law professors, have ignored what Professor Jaffe once called
the crucial controversy in personal injury torts.'99 Among the
impressive features of the law of damages for personal injuries
today is the extent to which the rules confer discretion on juries
who often receive no instruction as to whether they may consider various factors bearing on the amount of damages.FO0
In many jurisdictions, a plaintiff may receive two allowances
for taxes that he will not be required to pay.20 ' If the law of
torts is to be limited to the compensatory function of placing
195. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050

(1916).
196. See, e.g., Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINbr. L. Rnv.
573 (1942).
197. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).

198.
199.
LAw &
200.

Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So. 2d 541 (1951).
Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
CONTEmp. PROB. 219, 221-22 (1953).
See GREGORY & KALvEN, CAsEs AND MATERiALS ON ToRTS, ch. 7

passim (1959).

201. See Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 10 Onio
ST. L.J. 212 (1958).
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the victim, as far as possible, in the position in which he would
have been absent the tort, the courts should reformulate the rules
and instructions that require a consideration of income tax consequences in the verdict.
Other rules relating to the effect to be given collateral sources
of compensation for injuries also need reworking.202 In making
such changes, the courts may act with the freedom derived from
the realization that new rules would impose no new duties, nor
would they discriminate against persons who had relied on the
old rules. Courts, more effectively than legislatures, can determine the procedural complications that might arise from admitting evidence of, and giving effect to, collateral compensation
received by a tort victim. Moreover, judges, unlike legislators,
are aware of the underlying theories of liability; thus they can
more effectively determine whether a punitive or deterrent effect
may be achieved by visiting liability upon a wrongdoer for an
item of damage for which other compensation has already been
received, or when the more appropriate view is that "our legal
system functions as an insurance scheme under which victims
should receive full, but unduplicated, compensation for the injuries they have suffered. 203 Insurance companies might be expected to lobby for legislation limiting the damages awarded in
personal injury cases by the amounts received from collateral
sources, but in fact they have not done so. Instead, the cost of
double and even triple compensation is passed on to the public
and this inflated cost of compensating for tortious injuries is
advanced as a reason for not incorporating broader principles
of insurance in the law of torts.
These comparative evaluations of the abilities of courts and
legislatures certainly do not exhaust the field. Detailed attention
might be accorded to the predictable problems involved in compensating injuries suffered by radiation, where the complications
seem too great for traditional treatment by the courts.20- 4 Or

attention might be given to more familiar problems, such as the
appropriate use of Tes ipsa loquitur, burden of proof, physical
examination of plaintiffs in personal injury cases, and the selection of jurors, with respect to which courts are in a superior
202. For a recent and thorough discussion of the subject, see Maxcwll,
The Collateral Source RvIe in the American Law of Damages, 46 M
11Ev. 669 (1962).

203. Of.James, supra note 167, at 837.
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204. But cf. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics, 59 McH. L. IRv.
259 (1960).
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position to deal with the problems. Other comparable problems
easily come to mind.
But the purpose of this Article has not been that of making
a definitive assignment of some problems to legislative treatment
and other problems to judicial treatment. Instead it has been
merely to suggest some of the criteria by which those assignments should be made and further to suggest that courts should
attempt to evaluate the comparative abilities of the two branches
of government in deciding whether they or the legislature should
undertake what appears to be a needed reform in the law of torts.

